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Abstract 
This research objective is to demonstrate the pork-barrel in Thailand’s rice trading business among rice farmers, 
millers, and exporters, under the conduct of the government before and after its populism policy, which has created 
pork-barrel in a way that has built or diminished economic inequality as well as unfairness. With regression analysis, 
we found that the benefit sharing structural model among rice farmers, millers, and exporters, before the policy 
implementation indicates a proportion of 68-2-30, whereas it becomes 17-22-61 after the implementation. After 
classifying the populism policy as two different regimes of paddy pledging and rice farmer income guarantee, it is 
observed that the benefit sharing structural model for the paddy pledging scheme is 17-22-61, which shows a 
tendency to generate deeper economic inequality and unfairness than that under the rice farmer income guarantee 
scheme, which seems to mitigate such problem at the benefit sharing of 87-4-9. 
Keywords: Populism policy, Thailand’s rice trading business, Rice farmer income guarantee, Rice pledging 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Economic “Inequality” and “Unfairness” 
Under severe controversies in the Thai society at present, the problems which are considered as the real cause of this 
crisis (Yodpuang, 2011) and the most important matter (Thai Post, 2009) requiring an urgent resolution (Manager 
Online 2011) as a “national priority”, are “inequality” and “unfairness” of our brothers and sisters living on “the 
same land but seems like a different world”. 
“Economic” inequality and unfairness are particularly the clearest aspects of disparity (Achavanuntakul, 2011: 38) 
besides “civil rights” and “opportunities” (Yodpuang, 2011) in “accessing resource and basic infrastructure” 
(Phongpaichit, 2011). 
The analysis of the empirical data on economic and social situation of households by the National Statistical Office 
which are assessed by the Social Data-based and Indicator Development Office under the Office of the National 
Economic and Social Development Board (2010), indicates that the country’s past economic development has caused 
an increase of income of the majority of Thai population (Achavanuntakul, 2011: 38), causing the proportion of the 
impoverished to decrease from 42.21 percent in 2531 to 8.21 percent in 2009. However, this appears contrary to “the 
Gini Inequality Coefficient” of income, which has hardly altered from 1998 at 0.487 until 2009 at 0.485. Likewise, 
the 4.58 percent income allocation of the poorest population, accounting for 20 percent of the whole population (244 
baht/month) has minimally increased to 4.79 percent (1,503 baht/month). At the same time, 20 percent of the total 
population who are among the wealthiest has increased their income allocation from 54.37 percent (2,897 
baht/month) or 11.88 times of the poorest 23 years ago, to 54.19 percent (16,993 baht/month) or 11.31 times of the 
poorest in the past two years.  
With the current overall situation of the country’s income distribution, it cannot help believing “the rich still get 
richer and the poor get poorer” (Matichon Online, 2011) as always happened in the past. It is also currently 
happening in many countries around the world, resulting from developments and policy strategy which 
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disproportionately emphasize economic growth, ignore the significance of income distribution and stability with 
equality and fairness, as well as neglect to prevent such inconsistency from getting worse (Phongpaichit, 2011: 7-9). 
 
1.2 “Farmers” Who Work the Hardest but Remain the Poorest 
“Farmer” is considered a very important occupation as he is the producer of “rice”, the main staple of the Thai 
population and the number one agricultural export of the nation. Farmer is also respected as “the backbone of the 
nation” which has been written in a song portraying that “farmers are hard working as the backbone of the nation. 
Thailand will be powerful because it is an agricultural nation”. Despite this fact, the farmers, who are the majority of 
the population, or approximately 3.7 million households (Wongsamut, 2010), bearing such burdens, turn out to be 
those who “work the hardest” and in the meantime, they are also “the poorest” in the Thai society (Sichan, 2003: 40).  
Such destitution was depicted by Teera Wongsamut (2010), Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, during the first 
National Rice Conference on 16 December 2010 at Kasetsart University. The message was that Thai farmers are 
impoverished not only in comparison with other occupations but also in itself. In other words, farmers’ income is 
below the “poverty line”. This is due to various causes, including the average farmland of 15 rai held by a farmer, 
which is less than the minimum of 35 rai to cover the costs of farming, natural disasters, price fluctuation, as well as 
limited bargaining power in price (because the price mainly depends on global market price) (Jermsittiparsert, 
Sriyakul and Rodboonsong, 2011). 
The abovementioned is consistent with the statistical data of poverty and income distribution of the Office of the 
National Economic and Social Development Board (2010), which reveals that the number of the poor in the 
agricultural sector (out of total of 5.7 million agriculturalist households, farmers account for 3.7 million households 
or 65 percent) is more than two million people. At present, these two million poor people reflect the majority or more 
than 40 percent of the poor in the entire country, approximately five million people. 
 
1.3 The “Populism” Policy and Building/Diminishing Economic “Inequality” and “Unfairness” 
While the production of rice, export quantity, the world market price, as well as the money circulated in the Thai rice 
trading business, are projected to continue to increase, farmers who bear burdens and the highest risks, still cannot 
overcome the deadly cycle of “in-season rice farming is all about stubbles and debts, and off-season one is all about 
debts and stubbles” (Sichan, 2003: 41). This reflects the very existence of the problem of inequality and unfairness in 
benefit sharing among relevant people. 
Since 1965, there have been efforts to innovate and provide assistance by government policies in order to reduce 
poverty (Puapongsakorn and Jarupong, 2010: (1-2)), including lessening inequality between producers and 
consumers in the urban area (Siamwalla, Pinthong and Tosanguan, 1981: 197), with the application of the rice price 
support policy or the minimum price guarantee. 
The result of such policy implementations turned out to result in more unfair distribution of economic rents, and 
millers became the main beneficial of 54 percent. Rank second was government officers and politicians at the share 
of 27 percent; followed by farmer leaders at 6 percent and farmers for only 13 percent (Puapongsakorn and Jarupong, 
2010: (2-1)). 
The failure of direct price intervention in the aspects of loss, failure to support price, as well as the trend of 
increasing and severe inequality, caused the government to switch to indirect intervention to market mechanism, that 
is the paddy pledging scheme from crop year 1981/1982. 
The significant change of the paddy pledging program occurred in 2001 during the Thaksin Shinawatra 
administration when the government announced to expand its goal of pledging from 2.5 to 8.7 million tons and to 
augment loans to 100 percent of the leading goal price. Afterwards, the government assigned the leading goal price 
higher than the market price for 30 percent in the next three crop years. 
The research of Puapongsakorn and Jarupong (2010: (2-4)) on benefit sharing in the in-season paddy pledge program 
for crop year 2005/2006 indicated the change from the policy having been implemented for more than two decades. 
The farmers participating in the program received large benefit share of 37.25 percent. The exporters who won the 
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government rice bidding came second with 23.42 percent share. The millers participating in the program accounted 
for 18.01 percent. The cost borne by the government accounted for 13.69 percent and the remaining 7.63 percent 
share went to central inventories and surveyors, as well as qualitative and quantitative depreciations. 
During the Samak Suntoravet administration, the paddy pledge price was increased up to 14,000 baht per ton in 2008, 
which was considered raising the paddy pledge scheme to become a full-fledged “populism” policy in order to 
respond to the voting constituencies and political positions. 
The policy was altered again in the 2009 Abhisit Vejjajiva administration which abandoned paddy pledging and 
turned to rice farmer income guaranteeing. Up till now, there has been none of research demonstrating benefit 
sharing structure of such policy enforcement. Only comments and rhetoric from academics (Wisutthatham, 2011) and 
exporters (Funny S., 2011) exist and they are by far the proponents of the rice farmers’ income guarantee scheme and 
opposed to the paddy pledging scheme. 
In contrast, the rice farmers themselves give support to paddy pledging and even indicate their opinion against the 
rice farmers’ income guarantee that “such policy is to assist the rich, and real farmers will not receive much benefit 
from it” (Wongkorawut, 2011: 107). 
2. Objective 
First, the researchers aim to analyze two relationships: (1) between the first difference of the world market price of 
rice and that of the domestic market price of rice and (2) between the first difference of the domestic market price of 
rice and that of the domestic market price of paddy, before and after the implementation of the populism policy of 
paddy pledging and rice farmers’ income guarantee. 
Later, the study will reveal whether the determination, as well as the change, of the first difference of the domestic 
price of rice and that of the domestic price of paddy, is influenced by the first difference of the world market price of 
rice and that of the domestic price of rice. If so, how much does the influence have effects for each application of 
policies/schemes? 
Next, the researchers aim to prove that there is a pork barrel, i.e. benefit sharing, in the Thai rice trading business, 
among three interested groups, which are rice farmers, rice millers, and exporters, by applying the abovementioned 
empirical data on correlations and rates of change of both pairs of variables. This will indicate the nature of benefit 
sharing, in a way that could build or diminish economic inequality and unfairness in the rice trading business, which 
came from the government policy implementation, whether it is recognized as populism or not.    
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data and Variables 
The researchers select to use the time series data collected from the Agricultural Trade Support Bureau, Department 
of Internal Trade of the Ministry of Commerce of the total of 136 months, from January 2000 to April 2011, for the 
following variables: 
3.1.1 The first difference of the world market price of rice (CHGFOB) which is transformed from the world market 
price of rice (FOB) by the first difference method to represent the changing rate of price at which exporters sell to 
their foreign customers during each time period. 
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Figure 1. The World Market Price of Rice 
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Figure 2. The First Difference of the World Market Price of Rice 
 
3.1.2 The first difference of the domestic market price of rice (CHGBANGKOK) which is transformed from the 
domestic market price of 5 percent rice (BANGKOK) by the first difference method to represent the changing rate of 
price at which millers sell to their exporters during each time period. 
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Figure 3. The Domestic Market Price of Rice 
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Figure 4. The First Difference of the Domestic Market Price of Rice 
 
3.1.3 The first difference of the domestic market price of paddy (CHGRICE) which is transformed from the domestic 
market price of paddy at 15 percent moisture (RICE) by the first difference method to represent the changing rate of 
price at which rice farmers sell to their millers during each time period. 
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Figure 5. The Domestic Market Price of Paddy 
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Figure 6. The First Difference of the Domestic Market Price of Paddy 
3.2 Data Analysis 
The data are analyzed by regression analysis available in a built-in computer program application.    
4. Research Result 
4.1 Before the Populism Policy Implementation (January 2000 - March 2008) 
Initially, the researchers show whether, before the populism policy implementation, the correlation between the first 
difference of the world market price of rice and the first difference of the domestic market price of rice, and that 
between the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy and the first difference of the domestic market 
price of paddy exist. The question also asked is whether they are influenced by the first difference of the world 
market price of rice, and if yes, for what proportion. 
Table 1. Regression Analysis on the First Difference of the World Market Price of Rice and the First Difference of 
the Domestic Market Price of Rice 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -1.889514 21.70279 -0.087063 0.9308 
CHGFOB 27.91590 3.751695 7.440877 0.0000 
R-squared 0.671813 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4) 
 
Table 1 indicates that before the populism policy enforcement, the first difference of the world market price of rice 
has a positive correlation with the first difference of the domestic market price of rice. Every change for one US 
dollar of the first difference of the world market price of rice causes the same-direction change of the first difference 
of the domestic market price of rice for 27.92 baht. The first difference of the world market price of rice explains the 
first difference of the domestic market price of rice at 67.18 percent. 
Table 2. Regression Analysis on the First Difference of the Domestic Market Price of Rice and the First Difference of 
the Domestic Market Price of Paddy 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 6.855135 11.57959 0.592002 0.5552 
CHGBANGKOK 0.575596 0.081747 7.041189 0.0000 
R-squared 0.776803 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4) 
 
Table 2 indicates that before the populism policy enforcement, the first difference of the domestic market price of 
rice has a positive correlation with the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy. Every change for one 
Thai baht of the first difference of the domestic market price of rice causes the same-direction change of the first 
difference of the domestic market price of paddy for 0.58 baht. The first difference of the domestic market price of 
rice explains the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy at 77.68 percent. 
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Every change for 27.92 baht of the first difference of the domestic market price of rice will cause a change in the 
same direction of the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy for 16.07 baht. 
At the average currency exchange rate of 1 US dollar equivalent to 40.01 Thai baht during the period, the change of 
the first difference of the world market price of rice at every one baht will cause the first difference of the domestic 
market price of rice to change for 0.70 baht and the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy to change 
for 0.40 baht. 
Therefore, when considering the pork barrel derived from the change of the world market price of rice every one 
baht, the domestic market price of paddy, representing the benefit share to the rice farmers after calculation for the 
portion for milling paddy to rice at 1.67:1, results in 0.68 baht. The millers receive the difference at only 0.02 baht 
and the exporters at 0.30 baht. 
4.2 After the Populism Policy Implementation (April 2008 - April 2011) 
Next, the researchers show whether, after the populism policy implementation, the correlation between the first 
difference of the world market price of rice and the first difference of the domestic market price of rice, and that 
between the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy and the first difference of the domestic market 
price of paddy exist. The question also asked is whether they are influenced by the first difference of the world 
market price of rice, and if yes, for what proportion. 
Table 3. Regression Analysis on the First Difference of the World Market Price of Rice and the First Difference of 
the Domestic Market Price of Rice 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -159.3955 170.7596 -0.933450 0.3572 
CHGFOB 17.57973 5.672764 3.098971 0.0039 
R-squared 0.439045 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4) 
 
Table 3 indicates that after the populism policy enforcement, the first difference of the world market price of rice has 
a positive correlation with the first difference of the domestic market price of rice. Every change for one US dollar of 
the first difference of the world market price of rice causes the same-direction change of the first difference of the 
domestic market price of rice rice for 17.58 baht. The first difference of the world market price of rice explains the 
first difference of the domestic market price of rice at 43.90 percent. 
Table 4. Regression Analysis on the First Difference of the Domestic Market Price of Rice and the First Difference of 
the Domestic Market Price of Paddy 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -28.88301 57.70964 -0.500489 0.6200 
CHGBANGKOK 0.360805 0.073215 4.927994 0.0000 
R-squared 0.497396 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4) 
 
Table 4 indicates that after the populism policy enforcement, the first difference of the domestic market price of rice 
has a positive correlation with the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy. Every change for one Thai 
baht of the first difference of the domestic market price of rice causes the same-direction change of the first 
difference of the domestic market price of paddy for 0.36 baht. The first difference of the world market price of rice 
explains the first difference of the domestic market price of rice at 49.74 percent. 
Every change for 17.58 baht of the first difference of the domestic market price of rice will cause a change in the 
same direction of the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy for 6.33 baht. 
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At the average currency exchange rate of 1 US dollar equivalent to 32.91 Thai baht during the period, the change of 
the first difference of the world market price of rice at every one baht will cause the first difference of the domestic 
market price of rice to change for 0.53 baht and the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy to change 
for 0.19 baht. 
Therefore, when considering the pork barrel derived from the change of the world market price of rice every one 
baht, the domestic market price of paddy, representing the benefit share to the rice farmers after calculation for the 
portion for milling paddy to rice at 1.67:1, results in 0.32 baht. The millers receive the difference at only 0.21 baht 
and lastly the exporters at the highest benefit share of 0.47 baht. 
4.3 After the Paddy Pledging Regime Implementation (April 2008 - October 2009) 
At this stage, the researchers show whether, after the paddy pledging regime implementation, the correlation between 
the first difference of the world market price of rice and the first difference of the domestic market price of rice, and 
that between the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy and the first difference of the domestic market 
price of paddy exist. The question also asked is whether they are influenced by the first difference of the world 
market price of rice, and if yes, for what proportion. 
Table 5. Regression Analysis on the First Difference of the World Market Price of Rice and the First Difference of 
the Domestic Market Price of Rice 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -307.9085 341.7926 -0.900864 0.3810 
CHGFOB 13.22464 6.631904 1.994094 0.0635 
R-squared 0.282090 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4) 
 
Table 5 indicates that after the paddy pledging regime enforcement, the first difference of the world market price of 
rice has a positive correlation with the first difference of the domestic market price of rice. Every change for one US 
dollar of the first difference of the world market price of rice causes the same-direction change of the first difference 
of the domestic market price of rice of rice for 13.22 baht. The first difference of the world market price of rice 
explains the first difference of the domestic market price of rice at 28.21 percent. 
Table 6. Regression Analysis on the First Difference of the Domestic Market Price of Rice and the First Difference of 
the Domestic Market Price of Paddy 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -131.5186 109.4077 -1.202097 0.2468 
CHGBANGKOK 0.256527 0.061354 4.181126 0.0007 
R-squared 0.316621 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4) 
 
Table 6 indicates that after the paddy pledging regime enforcement, the first difference of the domestic market price 
of rice has a positive correlation with the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy. Every change for one 
Thai baht of the first difference of the domestic market price of rice causes the same-direction change of the first 
difference of the domestic market price of paddy for 0.26 baht. The first difference of the world market price of rice 
explains the first difference of the domestic market price of rice at 31.67 percent. 
Every change for 13.22 baht of the first difference of the domestic market price of rice will cause a change in the 
same direction of the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy for 3.44 baht. 
At the currency exchange rate of 1 US dollar equivalent to 34.14 Thai baht the change of the first difference of the 
world market price of rice at every one baht will cause the first difference of the domestic market price of rice to 
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change for 0.39 baht and the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy to change for 0.10 baht. 
Therefore, when considering the pork barrel derived from the change of the world market price of rice every one 
baht, the domestic market price of paddy, representing the benefit share to the rice farmers after calculation for the 
portion for milling paddy to rice at 1.67:1, results in 0.17 baht. The millers receive the difference at 0.22 baht and 
lastly the exporters at the highest benefit share of 0.61 baht. 
4.4 After the Rice Farmers’ Income Guarantee Regime Implementation (November 2009 - April 2011) 
At this stage, the researchers show whether, after the implementation of the rice farmers’ income guarantee regime, 
the correlation between the first difference of the world market price of rice and the first difference of the domestic 
market price of rice, and that between the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy and the first 
difference of the domestic market price of paddy exist. The question also asked is whether they are influenced by the 
first difference of the world market price of rice, and if yes, for what proportion. 
Table 7. Regression Analysis on the First Difference of the World Market Price of Rice and the First Difference of 
the Domestic Market Price of Rice 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -121.7549 60.12796 -2.024931 0.0611 
CHGFOB 28.92340 2.093555 13.81545 0.0000 
R-squared 0.899614 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4) 
 
Table 7 indicates that after the rice farmers’ income guarantee regime enforcement, the first difference of the world 
market price of rice has a positive correlation with the first difference of the domestic market price of rice. Every 
change for one US dollar of the first difference of the world market price of rice causes the same-direction change of 
the first difference of the domestic market price of rice for 28.92 baht. The first difference of the world market price 
of rice explains the first difference of the domestic market price of rice at 89.96 percent. 
Table 8. Regression Analysis on the First Difference of the Domestic Market Price of Rice and the First Difference of 
the Domestic Market Price of Paddy 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 52.43527 66.19733 0.792106 0.4406 
CHGBANGKOK 0.569554 0.090677 6.281123 0.0000 
R-squared 0.811494 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4) 
 
Table 8 indicates that after the rice farmers’ income guarantee regime enforcement, the first difference of the 
domestic market price of rice has a positive correlation with the first difference of the domestic market price of 
paddy. Every change for one Thai baht of the first difference of the domestic market price of rice causes the same-
direction change of the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy for 0.57 baht. The first difference of the 
world market price of rice explains the first difference of the domestic market price of rice at 81.14 percent. 
Every change for 28.92 baht of the first difference of the domestic market price of rice will cause a change in the 
same direction of the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy for 16.48 baht. 
At the currency exchange rate of 1 US dollar equivalent to 31.61 Thai baht the change of the first difference of the 
world market price of rice at every one baht will cause the first difference of the domestic market price of rice to 
change for 0.91 baht and the first difference of the domestic market price of paddy to change for 0.52 baht. 
Therefore, when considering the pork barrel derived from the change of the world market price of rice every 
one baht, the domestic market price of paddy, representing the benefit share to the rice farmers after calculation 
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for the portion for milling paddy to rice at 1.67:1, results in 0.87 baht. The millers receive the difference at only 
0.04 baht and the exporters receive the share of 0.09 baht. 
5. Conclusion and Recommendation 
5.1 Conclusion 
The analysis of the relationship between the first difference of the world market price of rice and the first difference 
of the domestic market price of rice and between the first difference of the domestic market price of rice and the first 
difference of the domestic market price of paddy for each policy/regime, brings about the model of the structure of 
pork-barrel among rice farmers, millers, and exporters in the Thai rice trading business as follows: 
Before the populism policy implementation, rice farmers received the highest share of benefits that is at 68 percent, 
whereas the exporters acquired at 30 percent and the millers at 2 percent. 
After the application of the populism policy, the structure of benefit sharing altered. Rice farmers who previously had 
been the highest benefiters of 68 percent were reduced their benefit share by more than half to 32 percent. 
Meanwhile, exporters and millers received higher benefit shares of 47 percent and 21 percent consecutively. 
When classifying the populism policy as the paddy pledging scheme and the rice farmer income guarantee one, the 
researchers found that paddy pledging provided the highest of history-recorded share of benefits to exporters at 61 
percent. In the meantime, rice farmers acquired the lowest history-recorded benefit share of merely 17 percent. 
Comparing with the structure of benefit sharing in the regime of rice farmers’ income guarantee, the share of benefits 
to rice farmers turned out to be the highest in the history at 87 percent. During the same period, exporters received 
the benefit share of 9 percent and millers’ of 4 percent. All of these imply that the populism policy, which is observed 
as more advantageous than disadvantageous and at the same is deeply attached to the Thai society, has become one 
variable which could either build or diminish economic inequality as well as unfairness. 
In the case of the Thai rice trading business, outcomes of the analyses show that even though paddy pledging has 
been recognized and applauded by rice farmers, such regime provides the highest benefit share to exporters and the 
least to rice farmers. On the contrary, the regime of rice farmers’ income guarantee turns out to be the regime 
appropriating the highest benefit share to rice farmers. However, likely due to the fact of continuously decreasing 
world market price of rice, as well as the policy, the rice farmer income guarantee regime has not been approved nor 
appreciated by rice farmers. 
So as to examine the actual phenomenon of these regimes/policies, the researchers interviewed three experts who are 
Chaiyawonnagal (2011), Ratruengrabin (2011) and Mr.S. (2011). The information from the interviews is found to be 
close to the empirical data results. 
Table 9. Comparison of the Benefit Sharing Classified by Each Policy/Regime Implementation 
 Rice Farmers Millers Exporters 
Before the Populism Policy Implementation 68 2 30 
(Experts) 50-55 15-20 30 
After the Populism Policy Implementation 32 21 47 
(Experts) 30 15-30 20-70 
After the Regime of Paddy Pledging 17 22 61 
After the Regime of Rice Farmer Income Guarantee 87 4 9 
5.2 Recommendation 
This analysis of the empirical data is, therefore, a reminder to two groups of peoples. First, a group of people having 
their interests in establishing a government policy must be more thorough in issuing or applying any populism policy 
regime because besides the poverty aspect, an aspect of inequality and unfairness is also one important problem in 
the Thai society, which becomes more and more severe these days. Second, and the most important of all, is civil 
people who need to realize the necessity of proofs and the truth whether different policies established and applied by 
the government are implemented with good faith or with a hidden agenda, as well as whether and how much they are 
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beneficial to the public as a whole.    
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